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Abstract
According to Pareto, the distribution of income depends on “the na-
ture of the people comprising a society, on the organization of the latter,
and, also, in part, on chance.” An overlapping generations model of mar-
riage, fertility and income distribution is developed here. The “nature of
the people” is captured by attitudes toward marriage, divorce, fertility, and
children. Singles search for mates in a marriage market. They are free to
accept or reject marriage proposals. Married agents make their decisions
through bargaining about work, and the quantity and quality of children.
They can divorce. Social policies, such as child tax credits or child support
requirements, re‡ect the “organization of the (society).” Finally, “chance”
is modelled by randomness in income, opportunities for marriage, and mar-
ital bliss.
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1. Introduction
Income Distribution: Just over one hundred years ago, Vilfredo Pareto (1896,
p.305) plotted the number of people, N , earning more than a given income level,
x, against this level of income. He found this relationship to be a straight line
(when the variables were expressed in logarithms), and it has been immortalized
as the Pareto distribution.1 Pareto felt that the income distribution could be
explained by “the nature of the people comprising a society, on the organization
of the latter, and, also, in part, on chance (p. 304).” Economists have been
fascinated with the distribution of income ever since. Champernowne (1953)
derived the Pareto distribution as the limiting distribution of a Markov chain for
individual income. The Champernowne (1953) model, while illustrative, is really
an exercise in statistical mechanics.2
Economists know that an individual’s position on the income scale is not just
determined by his or her own dumb luck. Family background is also important.
The correlation between a father’s and a son’s income is quite high. [This evi-
dence is surveyed in Stokey (1998)]. Furthermore, family structure is important.
Married men make more money than single men [Cornwell and Rupert (1997)].
A female-headed family with children has about one third the median income of
a married family with children. Children from a single-parent household do much
worse than children from a two-parent family on many dimensions: they are much
1Let lnN = lnA ¡ ® lnx. Then, N = Ax¡®, which is the Pareto distribution (providing
® > 0).
2Pareto believed that a probability model (based on chance alone) couldn’t generate enough
skewness to provide the basis for society’s income distribution. Champernowne’s (1953) results
show that this belief was misplaced.
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more likely to be out of school, out of work, or experience an out-of-wedlock birth
[McLanahan and Sandefur (1994)]. Other things equal, families with lower income
also tend to have more children [Knowles (1998)]. Hence, resources per child are
less in low income families, both because there is less income and because this
income has to be spread over more family members. This point has been made
forcefully by Kuznets (1989, p. 230-231):
It makes little sense to talk about inequality in the distribution of in-
come among families or households by income per family or household
when the underlying units di¤er so much in size. A large income for a
large family may turn out to be small on a per person or per consumer
equivalent basis, and a small income for a small family may turn out
to be large with the allowances for size of the family. Size distribu-
tions of income among families or households by income per family or
household, re‡ecting as they do di¤erences in size, are unrevealing ...
It follows that, before any analysis of family can be undertaken, size
distributions of families or households by income per family must be
converted to distributions of persons (or consumer equivalents) by size
of family or household income per person (or per consumer).
Therefore, to understand fully the determinants of the distribution of income
in society it is important to understand the determinants of both marriage and
fertility.
The Model : To do this, an overlapping generations model of the family is
built here. The world is made up of males and females. The model has four
key ingredients. First, marriage is modeled along the search-theoretic lines of
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Mortenson (1988). Each period every adult must make a decision on whether or
not to stay with his or her mate. If an adult rejects his or her mate, then he or
she is free to look for another one in the future.
Second, in line with the work by Mansur and Brown (1980) and McElroy and
Horney (1981), decisions within a marriage are arrived at via Nash Bargaining.
There is evidence that allocations with the household are not decided in a man-
ner consistent with a single decision maker who maximizes some common set of
preferences for the family — the unitary preference model. For instance, when
government child allowances where transferred from husbands to wives in Great
Britain during the late 1970’s resource allocations within the household became
more tilted toward the wives — see Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997). The
higher the ratio of eligible males to females in a population the more the re-
source allocations within a marriage favor the wife [Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix
(1998)]. These …nding are consistent with Nash Bargaining where the alloca-
tion of resources within the family depends upon the relative bargaining power of
husband and wife.
Third, as in Barro and Becker (1988) and Razin and Ben-Zion (1975), adults
decide how many children to have. Fourth, following the work of Becker and
Tomes (1993) and Loury (1981) parents must decide how much time and goods
to invest in their children. In addition to Champernowne’s (1953) luck, these
parental investments determine the productivity of a child when he or she grows
up.
In the equilibrium modelled, some adults are married while others are not,
some women have large families and others small ones, some people are rich while
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others are poor.3 The framework results in an equilibrium income distribution.
An example is presented where a signi…cant number of children live with a single
mother. Some of these mothers are unwed, others are divorced.4 These children
grow up to earn much less than children raised in a two-parent family. The girls
from a single-parent family are also more likely to experience an out-of- wedlock
birth or a divorce than the girls from two-parent families. And, so the cycle
perpetuates itself implying a low degree of intergenerational mobility. There is a
3Aiyagari, Greenwood and Guner (2000) have combined the Mortenson (1988) paradigm with
the Becker and Tomes (1993) framework to model the plight of single-parent families. In their
analysis the formation and dissolution of families and investment in children are endogenous.
Family size is held …xed. Husband and wife play a noncooperative Nash game. The Barro and
Becker (1988) model has been wedded with Becker and Tomes (1993) framework by Knowles
(1999) to study the e¤ects that redistribution policies may have on poverty when fertility and
investment in children are endogenous. Here a single-sex model is employed. In a sense the
current analysis goes one step further by combining all three things together. This task is not
simple. Nash Bargaining plays a vital and natural role in such an extension. The choice to
have children involves dynamic considerations. When deciding how many children to have, a
married couple must take into account the possibility of a future breakup. A male’s and female’s
attitude toward children, both within and out of marriage, may di¤er from one another. Nash
bargaining allows for these di¤erences to be reconciled. As will be seen, the form poised for
household decision making has important implications for the study of marriage and fertility.
Last, building a model of marriage and fertility is important for understanding the distribution
of income. A large fraction of poor children live with a single parent and low-wage earners tend
to have more kids. Modelling these facts is important for understanding the distribution of
income.
4Regalia and Rios-Rull (1999) also develop a model of marriage and divorce. They use their
model to analyze the rise in single motherhood since the 1970s. They attribute a signi…cant
fraction of this increase to the (relative) rise in female wages.
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negative relationship between income and fertility, as in the data. That is, poor
families tend to have more children. This exacerbates income inequality. Last, the
equilibrium income distribution is approximately lognormal with a Pareto tail.
Computational General Equilibrium Analysis and Public Policy: The Cowles
Commission was an advocate of the use of models in economics. It felt that
economic models would be useful for dealing with the simultaneity problem in
economics and predicting the consequences of out-of-sample variation in policies
or other exogenous variables. Computational general equilibrium models can be
used in this regard, in addition to conventional econometric analysis.5 The natural
policy experiments to consider in the current context are anti-poverty programs.
To illustrate the potential uses of computational general equilibrium models of the
family, the e¤ects of child tax credits and child support payments are investigated.
With child tax credits, families will now have more income per child, other things
equal. Thus, their children should be better o¤. But other things may not be
5The need for dynamic general equilibrium models of the family has been noted by labor
economists. For instance, according to McElroy (1997, p. 53) while there has been much work on
partial equilibrium models of the household “little analysis has been based upon the appropriate
general equilibrium framework, the marriage market.” Weiss (1997, p 120) in his survey on the
literature on marriage and divorce states that when “examining the economic contributions, the
main obstacles is the scarcity of equilibrium models which carefully tie the individual behavior
with the market constraints and outcomes. Consequently, we do yet have a convincing model
which explains aggregate family formation and dissolution.” The study for such models for
policy analysis has been noted. “A model of marital search would be a more accurate descriptor
of AFDC entry and exits ... ” than a model of job search, says Mo¢tt (1992, 26). Hoynes
(1997, p. 95) echoes this sentiment stating that relative to the classic, but static, Beckerian
model of marriage “a dynamic model of marital search is a natural extension, but has yet to be
developed in the literature.”
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equal, if such a policy promotes a larger family size. In the calculations undertaken
here, a child tax credit fails to elevate the level of well being in society due to an
increase in family size. Child support payments insulate children against the drop
in family income that occurs when their parents divorce. On the one hand, child
support payments make divorce less attractive to married males and marriage
less attractive to single ones, at least other things equal. On the other hand,
child support payments will make divorce more attractive to married females and
marriage more attractive to single ones. In the analysis undertaken here the
e¤ects of child support on the equilibrium number is almost a wash. The number
of marriages and the average level of income increase only slightly. The size of
the e¤ect is found to depend crucially upon how decisions are undertaken within
the marriage.
The model presented here is intended as a prototype. It is still too primitive
to be used for public policy purposes. Before serious policy analysis can be un-
dertaken, more needs to be known about the choice of various components into
the model: the way decisions are undertaken within the family; the appropriate
way to model the interface between parents and their children6; the choice of
functional forms for tastes and technology, such as the human capital production
function; the choice of parameter values. As research progresses, answers to these
questions will begin to emerge. So, future generations of this type of model may
yield reliable answers to public policy questions about the family.
6For instance, do parents care more about the investments they undertake in their children
or their children’s expected utility? Do parents choose their investments strategically to ensure
certain outcomes in their o¤springs? Do children play strategically in order to get more transfers
from their parents?
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2. Economic environment
Consider an economy populated by two groups of agents, females and males.
Agents live for four periods: two periods as children, and two periods as adults.
Let young and old refer to the …rst and second period of adulthood respectively. At
any point in time, the female and male populations each consist of a continuum of
children and a continuum of adults. Children become adults after they have been
raised by their parents for two periods. Each adult is indexed by a productivity
level. Let x denote the type (productivity) of an adult female, and z denote the
type (productivity) of an adult male. Assume that x and z are contained in the
sets X = fx1; x2; : : : ; xSg and Z = fz1; z2; : : : ; zSg.
At the beginning of each period, there exists a marriage market for single
agents. Any single agent can take a draw from this market. Agents are free to
accept or reject a mate as they desire. If a single agent accepts a draw, s/he is
married for the current period, provided of course, that the other person agrees
too. Otherwise, the agent is single and can take a new draw at the beginning of
the next period. Similarly, at the beginning of each period, married agents decide
to remain married or get divorced. A divorced agent needs to remain single one
period before having a new draw. Therefore, given the two-period overlapping
generations structure remarriage is ruled out. Furthermore, assume that agents
only match with people of the same generation.
Females are only fecund for the …rst period of their adult life. Therefore, each
period, young married couples and young single adult females decide how many
children to have. A child has equal chances of being a female or a male. Let
k denote the number of children a female has. Assume that k is contained in
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the set K = f0; 1; :::; Kg. Children stay with their mothers, if their parents get
divorced. A divorced male has to pay child support payments to his former wife
after divorce.
Agents are endowed with one unit of (nonsleeping) time in each period. Fe-
males must split this time between work, child-care, and leisure. Males divide
their time between work and leisure. A married male has to spend a …xed amount
of time per child on homework.
Married agents derive utility from the consumption of a public household good,
from human capital investment in their children, from leisure, and from marital
bliss. Consumption of this household good depends upon the number of adults
and children in the family. Parents must decide how much time and goods to
invest in their children. This determines the level of human capital possessed by
their children. Parents treat their children equally. Single males care only about
their own consumption of goods and leisure and they do not worry about human
capital investment in their children. When a male marries a female with children,
however, he derives utility from the human capital investment in his stepchildren.
A single mother must make the decision on her own about how much time and
money to invest in her kids.
After two periods with their mother, children are endowed with productivity
levels that depend on the human capital investment received throughout their
childhood. Each period the oldest adult males and females die and are replaced
by the oldest children who enter into the marriage market.
2.1. Preferences
Females: Let the momentary utility function for a woman be
9
F (c; e; k; 1¡ l ¡ t) ´ U (c) + V (e; k) +R(1¡ l ¡ t¡ ¶fk)
´ c
ºf
ºf
+ !f
k»f
»f
e#f
#f
+ ±f
(1¡ l ¡ t¡ ¶fk)
&f
&f
:
Here c is the consumption of household production, which is a public good for the
family, k is the number of children, and e is human capital investment per child.
Females allocate l units of their time for work, and t units of it for child care or
nurture. They also incur a …xed time cost of ¶f per child.
Males: A male’s attitude toward children depends upon his marital status.
Males spend n units of their time working. The utility function for a married
male is described by
M(c; e; k; 1¡ n;Â) ´ U (c) + P (e; k;Â) + S(1¡ n¡ ¶mk)
´ c
ºm
ºm
+ Â!m
k»m
»m
e#m
#m
+ ±m
(1¡ n¡ ¶mk)
&m
&m
;
where
Â =
8<: 1; if he is married, living with his own children,¸ < 1; if he is married, not living with his own children.
Married males incur a …xed time cost of ¶m per child. The functions V and P
imply that the married male’s attitudes toward the welfare of children is allowed
to di¤er from the female’s. The utility function for a single male can be expressed
simply as M (c; e; 0; 1¡ n; 0); a single male does not realize any utility from the
children borne through previous relationships.
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2.2. Household consumption
Let p denote the number of adults in a household. Then, the consumption for a
household with p adults and k children is given by
c = ª(p; k)[Y (l; n; x; z)¡ d]¡ °I(q); for q = m; s,
where
ª(p; k) =
µ
1
p + bk
¶´
; 0 < ´ < 1; 0 < b < 1;
and
Y (l; n; x; z) =
8>>><>>>:
(xl + zn); for a married couple,
xl; for a single woman,
zn; for a single man,
and where the indicator function I returns a value of one for a married household
and zero otherwise so that I(m) = 1 and I(s) = 0.
The function Y has a clear interpretation under the above parameterization.
The variables x and z can be thought of as the market wages for type-x females
and type-z males. The function ª translates household production into the con-
sumption realized by adult family members. There are scale e¤ects in household
consumption in the sense that each additional child costs less to feed and clothe
than the one before. Still, it does cost more to maintain the extra child. Likewise,
the second adult costs less than the …rst. The variable d represents the amount of
household production that is used for investment in children. A single male will
always set this to zero; because, either he has no children or he doesn’t realize
utility from them.
The parameter ° represents the quality of the match between a male and
a female. Let ° 2 G = f°1; °2; :::; °mg be a discrete random variable. For an
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unmarried couple this variable is drawn, after they are matched but before the
marriage decision, according to distribution function ¡(°h) = Pr[° = °h]. For
a married couple the variable ° then evolves over time according the process
¢(°nj°h) = Pr[°0 = °nj° = °h]. Given the value drawn for °0, each party in a
marriage decides whether to remain married.
2.3. Transmission of Human Capital
Human capital investment per child in a household with k children is given by
e = Q(t; d; k) ´
µ
t
k1
¶®
(
d
k2
)1¡®; for 0 < 1; 2 < 1;
which transforms the child-care time of the mother, t, and the amount of the
home produced good, d, into human capital investment, e. Recall that children
are nurtured for two periods. At the end of every period the children of the oldest
generation enter into the marriage market as single adults. The productivity levels
for females are drawn from the distribution
¥(xije¡2 + e¡1) = Pr[x = xije¡2 + e¡1];
and for males from
¤(zjje¡1 + e¡1) = Pr[z = zjje¡2 + e¡1];
where e¡1 and e¡2 indicate the human capital investment during the two periods
of an agent’s childhood. The distribution functions ¥ and ¤ are stochastically
increasing in e¡2+ e¡1 in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance. Thus,
higher human capital investment in children by parents increases the likelihood
that children will be successful in life.
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The conditional distribution ¥ is represented by a discrete approximation to
a lognormal distribution with mean, ¹xje, and standard deviation, ¾xje. Similarly,
suppose that ¤ is also given by discrete approximation to a lognormal with mean,
¹zje, and standard deviation, ¾zje. These conditional means are given by,
¹xje = ¹zje = "1(e¡2 + e¡1)
"2; for "2 2 (0; 1);
where the "’s are the parameters governing the technology that maps human
capital investment by parents into productivity levels.
After the …rst period of adulthood the productivity levels for females and males
evolve according to the following transition functions:
X(xj jxi) = Pr[x0 = xj jx = xi];
and
Z(zjjzi) = Pr[z0 = zj jz = zi];
where x0 and z0 denote the next-period values. These Markov chains are con-
structed to approximate an AR(1) in logarithms.7
3. Decision Making
3.1. Household Activity — Single Old Adults
A single old female of type x with k children will solve the following problem:
G2(x; k; z) =max
l, t,d
F (c; e; k; 1¡ l ¡ t) P(1)
7The discrete approximations for ¥, ¤, X, and Z follow the procedure outlined in Tauchen
(1986).
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subject to
c = ª(1; k)[Y (l; 0;x; 0) +A(z; k)¡ d]
and
e = Q(t; d; k);
where
A(z; k) = azNs(z; k)k:
Here z denotes her former husband’s productivity and the function N s(z; k) de-
notes his labor supply. The function A determines how much child support a
former husband has to pay, which is assumed to be a fraction, a, of his current
income, zNs(z; k), per child. Obviously, for a single old female who was never
married z = 0.
Denote a single mother’s level of human capital investment in her children by
e = Es2(x; k; z).
This implies that Es2(x; k; z)=Q(T
s
2 (x; k; z); D
s
2(x; k; z); k), where T
s
2 (x; k; z) and
Ds2(x; k; z) are the decision rules for t and d that arise from P(1).
The maximized utility of a single old male is given by the following problem:
B2(z; k) =max
n
M(c; 0; 0; 1¡ n; 0) P(2)
subject to
c ´ ª(1; 0)[Y (0; n; 0; z)¡ aznk]
´ zn¡ aznk = zn(1¡ ak); 0 < a < 1;
where k denotes the number of children for whom he has to pay child support.
For a single old male who was never married k = 0:
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3.2. Household Activity — Old Married Adults with k children
Nash Bargaining Problem: Consider a couple of type (x; z; °; k; Â) that is married
in the second period. Assume that they make their decisions by applying the
Nash solution to a …xed-threat bargaining game. Their problem is to solve
max
l;t;n;d
[F (c; e; k; 1¡ l¡ t)¡G2(x; k; z)]£ [M(c; e; k; 1¡ n;Â)¡B2(z; k)] P(3)
subject to
c = ª(2; k)[Y (l; n; x; z)¡ d]¡ ° = ª(2; k)[xl + zn¡ d]¡ °;
and
e = Q(t; d; k):
Here B2(z; k) and G2(x; k; z) and are the threat points for the husband and wife.
They are the values of being single in the second period, and are given by the
solutions for old single agent problems, P(1) and P(2).
Denote the level of human capital investment per child in a family with two
old parents by
e = Em2 (x; z; °; k;Â):
Let the resulting utility levels for an old husband and wife in a (x; z; °; k;Â)-
marriage, or the values for M and F in P(3) evaluated at the optimal choices for
l, t, n, d and the implied values for c and e, be represented by
H2(x; z; °; k;Â);
and
W2(x; z; °; k;Â): P’(3)
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3.3. Marriage — Old Adults
Consider an age-2 couple indexed by (x; z; °; k; Â). Each party faces a decision:
should s/he choose married or single life for the period. Clearly, a married female
will want to remain married if and only ifW2(x; z; °; k; 1) ¸ G2 (x; k; z); otherwise,
it is in her best interest to get a divorce. Equally as clearly, a single female will
desire to marry if and only if W2(x; z; °; k;¸) ¸ G2 (x; k; 0); otherwise, she’ll
go it alone. Similarly, a married male would wish to remain so if and only if
H2(x; z; °; k; 1) ¸ B2 (z; k), while a single male will like to marry if and only if
H2(x; z; °; k;¸) ¸ B2 (z; 0).
De…ne the indicator functions Iq2(x; z; °; k) for q = m; s, which summarizes the
matching decisions of married and single age-2 males, by
Iq2(x; z; °; k) =
8<: 1; if H2(x; z; °; k;Â) ¸ B2(z; I(q)k); for q = m; s,0; otherwise, P(4)
where I(m) = 1 and I(s) = 0. Note that Â is a function of the male’s marital
status at the time of the decision, since Â = 1 if q = m while Â = ¸ when q = s.
Likewise, for q = m; s let the indicator function J q2 (x; z; °; k) de…ne the matching
decisions for married and single age-2 females so that
Jq2(x; z; °; k) =
8<: 1; if W2(x; z; °; k; Â) ¸ G2(x; k; I(q)z); for q = m;s,0; otherwise. P(5)
3.4. Household Activity — Single Young Adults
Now, let the odds of drawing a single age-1 female of type xi in the marriage
market be represented by
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©1 (xi) , where ©1 (xi) ¸ 0 8xi and
SX
i=1
©1 (xi) = 1,
and the odds of meeting a single age-2 female of type xi with k children in the
marriage market be given by
©2 (xi; k) , where ©2 (xi; k) ¸ 0 8xi and
SX
i=1
KX
k=0
©2 (xi; k) = 1.
Likewise, the odds of meeting a single age-i male of type zi will be denoted by
-j (zi) , where -j (zi) ¸ 0 8zi and
SX
i=1
-j (zi) = 1:
A key step in the analysis will be to compute these matching probabilities.
The programming problem for an one-period-old single type-xi female is
G1 (xi) = max
k
fmax
l;t;d
fF (c; e; k; 1¡ l¡ t) + ¯
SX
j=1
SX
l=1
mX
n=1
maxfW2(xj; zl; °n; k;¸)
Is2(xk; zl; °n; k); G2(xj ; k; 0)gX(xjjxi)-2 (zl) ¡(°n)g: P(6)
subject to
c = ª(1; k)[Y (l; 0; x; 0)¡ d] = ª(1; k)[xil ¡ d];
and
e = Q(t; d; k):
In the above problem ¯ is the discount factor. Here -2 (zl) ¡(°n) gives the prob-
ability that a single female of type xi will meet a single male of type zl and that
their match will be of quality °n. Note that W2(xk; zl; °n; k;¸) is given by the
solution to the Nash Bargaining problem P(3) for a type-(xk; zl; °n; k;¸)marriage:
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Marriage is an option only if her mate is willing; that is, when Is2(xk; zl; °n; k) = 1.
The value G2(xk; k; 0) of remaining single is given by the solution to the problem
of an old single female, or by P(1).
Let the utility-maximizing decision rules for the quantity and quality of chil-
dren that solve this problem be represented by
k = Ks(xi);
and
e = Es1(x; k) = E
s
1(x;K
s(xi)):
The analogous recursion for a single male is
B1(zj) = max
n
fM(c; 0; 0; 1¡ n; 0) + ¯
SX
l=1
SX
i=1
KX
k=0
mX
n=1
maxfH2(xi; zl; °n; k;¸)
J s2(xk; zl; °n; k); B2(zl; 0)g©2(xi; k)Z(zljzj)¡(°n)g: P(7)
subject to
c = ª(1; 0)Y (0; n; 0; zj) = zjn;
where ©2(xi; k)¡(°n) is the probability of meeting an old single female of type-xi
with k children and having a match quality of °n.
3.5. Household Activity — Young Married Adults
Nash Bargaining Problem: Consider now the problem of a young married couple.
Applying the Nash Bargaining solution to the …xed-threat bargaining game facing
a young couple in a type-(xi; zj; °h) marriage gives
max
l;n;t;d;k
ffF (c; e; k; 1¡ l ¡ t) + ¯
SX
k=1
SX
l=1
mX
n=1
max[W2(xk; zl; °n; k; 1) I
m
2 (xl; zl; °n; k);
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G2(xk; k; zl)]¢(°nj°h)X (xkjxi)Z(zljzj)¡G1(xi)g
£fM(c; e; k; 1¡ n; 1) + ¯
SX
k=1
SX
l=1
mX
n=1
max[H2(xk; zl; °n; k; 1)J
m
2 (xk; zl; °n; k);
B2(zl; k)]¢(°nj°h)X (xkjxi)Z(zljzj) ¡B1(zj)gg P(8)
subject to
c = ª(2; k)[Y (l; n; xi; zj)¡ d]¡ °h = ª(2; k)[xil + zjn¡ d]¡ °h; (3.1)
and
e = Q(t; d; k): (3.2)
The threat points G1(xi) and B1(zj) are given by the solutions to the problems
for young single females and males. The female would like to remain married if
W2(xk; zl; °n; k; 1) ¸ G2(xk; k; zl) and get a divorce otherwise. Remaining mar-
ried is only feasible, however, if it is mutually agreeable or Im2 (xk; zl; °n; k) = 1.
Similarly, the male would like to remain married if H2(xk; zl; °n; k; 1) ¸ B2(zl; k),
which is feasible if Jm2 (xk; zl; °n; k) = 1:
Let the optimal decision rules for the quantity and quality of children in a
type-(xi; zj; °h) young marriage be denoted by
k = Km(xi; zj; °n);
and
e = Em1 (xi; zj; °h; k) = E
m
1 (xi; zj; °h;K
m(xi; zj; °h)):
Furthermore, let the expected lifetime utility for a young male and female arising
out of a type-(xi; zj; °h)-marriage be represented by
H1(xi; zj; °h); P’(8)
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and
W1(xi; zj ; °h):
3.6. Marriage — Young Adults
Then the marriage decisions for a randomly matched young couple, (x; z; °), are
given by
Is1(x; z; °) =
8<: 1; if H1(x; z; °) ¸ B1 (z) ;0; otherwise. P(9)
and
J s1 (x; z; °) =
8<: 1; if W1(x; z; °) ¸ G1 (x) ;0; otherwise. P(10)
For a marriage to occur it must be mutually agreeable, which requires that
Is1(x; z; °)J
s
1(x; z; °) = 1.
4. Equilibrium
4.1. Population Growth
The average number of children per female, k, is given by
k =
SX
i=1
SX
j=1
mX
h=1
©1 (xi)-1(zj)¡(°h)I
s
1(xi; zj; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj; °h)K
m(xi; zj; °h)
+
SX
i=1
©1 (xi) [1¡
SX
j=1
mX
h=1
-1(zj)¡(°h)I
s
1(xi; zj; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj; °h)]K
s(xi):
To understand this formula, note that the probability of a type-(xi; zj; °h) mar-
riage between young adults is ©1 (xi) -1(zj)¡(°h)I
s
1(xi; zj ; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj; °h). This
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match will generate Km(xi; zj; °h) kids. The odds that a woman will be type-xi
and remain single are ©1 (xi) [1¡
PS
j=1
Pm
h=1-1(zj)¡(°h)I
s
1(xi; zj; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj; °h)].
This woman will have Ks(xi) children. In a stationary equilibrium the growth
rate of the population, g, will therefore be
g =
r
k
2
:
4.2. Matching Probabilities
Young Adults: The probabilities of meeting a young female and male of a given
type in the marriage market are ©1(x) and -1(z). To determine these probabili-
ties, let ¨mm(xi; zj; °h; xk; zl; °n) represent the fraction of females who were mar-
ried in both periods and transited from state (xi; zj ; °h) to (xk; zl; °n). Likewise,
let ¨ss(xi; xk) denote the fraction of females who were single in both periods, and
transited from xi to xk, and ¨ms(xi; zj ; °h; xk; zl) denote the fraction of females
who su¤ered a marriage breakup, etc. Hence,
¨mm(xi; zj; °h; xk; zl; °n) ´ ©1 (xi)-1(zj)¡(°h)Is1(xi; zj; °h)J s1(xi; zj; °h)
£Im2 (xk; zl; °n; km)Jm2 (xk; zl; °n; km)¢(°nj°h)X(xkjxi)Z(zljzj);
¨ss(xi; xk) ´ ©1 (xi) [1¡
SX
j=1
mX
h=1
¡(°h)-1(zj)I
s
1(xi; zj ; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj; °h)]
£X(xkjxi)[1¡
SX
l=1
mX
n=1
¡(°n)I
s
2(xk; zl; °n; k
s)J s2(xk; zl; °n; k
s)-2(zl)];
¨ms(xi; zj; °h; xk; zl) ´ ©1 (xi)-1(zj)¡(°h)Is1(xi; zj; °h)J s1(xi; zj ; °h)X(xkjxi)Z(zljzj)
£ f
mX
n=1
¢(°nj°h)[1¡ Im2 (xk; zl; °n; km)Jm2 (xk; zl; °n; km)]g;
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¨sm(xi; xk; zl; °n) ´ ©1 (xi) [1¡
SX
j=1
mX
h=1
¡(°h)-1(zj)I
s
1(xi; zj; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj; °h)]
£Is2(xk; zl; °n; ks)Js2(xk; zl; °n; ks)¡(°n)X(xkjxi)-2(zl);(4.1)
where km ´ Km(xi; zj ; °h) and ks ´ Ks(xi).
Then, it is easy to see that the odds of meeting a young woman of type-xr in
the marriage market are given by
©1(xr) = f
X
i;j;l;h;n
¥(xrjEm1 (xi; zj; °h; Km(xi; zj; °h)) + Em2 (xk; zl; °n; Km(xi; zj; °h); 1))
£¨mm(xi; zj; °h; xk; zl; °n)Km(xi; zj; °h)
+
X
i
¥(xrjEs1(xi;Ks(xi)) + Es2(xk; Ks(xi); 0))¨ss(xi; xk)Ks(xi)
+
X
i;j;l;h
¥(xrjEm1 (xi; zj; °h; Km(xi; zj; °h)) + Es2(xk; Km(xi; zj ; °h); zl))
£¨ms(xi; zj; °h; xk; zl)Km(xi; zj; °h)
+
X
i;l;n
¥(xrjEs1(xi;Ks(xi)) + Em2 (xk; zl; °n; Ks(xi);¸))
£¨sm(xi; xk; zl; °n)Ks(xi)g=k. (4.2)
The probability of meeting a type-zr young man is determined analogously:
-1(zr) = f
X
i;j;l;h;n
¤(zrjEm1 (xi; zj; °h; Km(xi; zj; °h)) + Em2 (xk; zl; °n;Km(xi; zj; °h); 1))
£¨mm(xi; zj; °h; xk; zl; °n)Km(xi; zj; °h)
+
X
i
¤(zrjEs1(xi; Ks(xi)) + Es2(xk; Ks(xi); 0))¨ss(xi; xk)Ks(xi)
+
X
i;j;l;h
¤(zrjEm1 (xi; zj; °h; Km(xi; zj; °h)) + Es2(xk; Km(xi; zj; °h); zl))
£¨ms(xi; zj; °h; xk; zl)Km(xi; zj; °h)
+
X
i;l;n
¤(zrjEs1(xi; Ks(xi)) + Em2 (xk; zl; °n; Ks(xi);¸))
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£¨sm(xi; xk; zl; °n)Ks(xi)g=k.
Old Adults: Next, how are the odds of meeting a single age-2 type-x fe-
male with k children, ©2 (x; k), or of a single age-2 type-z male, -2 (z) de-
termined in stationary equilibrium? This depends upon the number of single
agents who remain unmarried from the previous period. So, how many are
there? Again, the number of married and single one-period-old type-xi females are
given by ©1 (xi)
PS
j=1
Pm
h=1-1(zj)¡(°h)I
s
1(xi; zj; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj; °h) and ©1 (xi) [1¡PS
j=1
Pm
h=1-1(zj)¡(°h)I
s
1(xi; zj ; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj; °h)]. Given this supply of one-period-
old single females, the quantity of two-period-old type-xj single females will bePS
i=1X(xjjxi)©1 (xi) [1¡
PS
j=1
Pm
h=1-1(zj)¡(°h)I
s
1(xi; zj; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj ; °h)].
Let
@(xi; k) =
8<: 1, if Ks(xi) = k;0, otherwise,
be an indicator function representing the number of children that a single one-
year-old female of type-xi has. Then, the odds of drawing a single two-period-old
type-xj female with k children in the marriage market will be
©2(xj; k) = f
SX
i=1
@(xi; k)X(xjjxi)©1 (xi) [1¡
SX
j=1
mX
h=1
¡(°h)-1(zj)I
s
1(xi; zj ; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj; °h)]g
¥f
SX
j=1
SX
i=1
X(xjjxi)©1 (xi) [1¡
SX
j=1
mX
h=1
¡(°h)-1(zj)I
s
1(xi; zj ; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj; °h)]g:(4.3)
The analogous formula for the odds of meeting a single two-period-old male of
type-zj , -2 (zi) ; reads
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-2 (zi) =
PS
j=1 Z(zijzj)-1(zj)[1¡
PS
i=1
Pm
h=1 ¡(°h)©1 (xi) I
s
1(xi; zj; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj ; °h)]PS
i=1
PS
j=1 Z(zijzj)-1(zj)[1¡
PS
i=1
Pm
h=1 ¡(°h)©1 (xi) I
s
1(xi; zj; °h)J
s
1(xi; zj ; °h)]
:
(4.4)
It’s now time to take stock of the situation so far.
De…nition 4.1. A stationary matching equilibrium can be represented by set of
child quantity and quality allocation rules, Km(x; z; °), Ks(x), Em2 (x; z; °; k;Â),
Es2(x; k; z), E
m
1 (x; z; °;K
m(x; z; °)), and Es1(x;K
s(x)), a set of accept/reject deci-
sion rules, Im2 (x; z; °; k), I
s
2(x; z; °; k), J
m
2 (x; z; °; k), J
s
2(x; z; °; k), I
s
1(x; z; °), and
J s1(x; z; °), and a set of matching probabilities, ©1(x), ©2(x; k), -1(z), and -2(z),
such that:
1. The child quality allocation rule Es2(x; k; z) solves the old single female’s
household problem P(1).
2. The child quantity and quality allocation rules Ks(x) and Es1(x;K
s(x)) solve
the young single female’s household problem P(6).
3. The child quality allocation rule Em2 (x; z; °; k;Â) solves the married old cou-
ple’s Nash bargaining problem P(3).
4. The child quality and quantity allocation rules Km(x; z; °) andEm1 (x; z; °;K
m(x; z; °))
solve the young married couple’s Nash bargaining problem P(8).
5. The old male’s accept/reject choices, Im2 (x; z; °; k) and I
s
2(x; z; °; k), are de-
scribed by P(4), in conjunction with P(2) and P’(3).
6. The young male’s accept/reject choice, Is2(x; z; °), is described by P(9), in
conjunction with P(7) and P’(8).
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7. The old female accept/reject choices, Jm2 (x; z; °; k) and J
s
2(x; z; °; k), are
described by P(5), in conjunction with P(1) and P’(3).
8. The young female’s accept/reject choice, J s1(x; z; °), is described by P(10),
in conjunction with P(6) and P’(8).
9. The matching probabilities, ©1(x), ©2(x; k), -1(z), and -2(z), are governed
by the stationary distributions described by (4.2) to (4.4).
At a general level, not much can be said about the properties of the above
model since the solution involves a complicated …xed-point problem. On the one
hand, in order to compute the solution to a young single agent’s choice problem
one needs to know the equilibrium matching probabilities. On the other hand,
calculating the equilibrium matching probabilities requires knowledge about the
solutions to each of the decision problems.
5. Some Computational Analysis
5.1. Benchmark Equilibrium
To gain some insight into the model’s mechanics, its solution will be computed
numerically.8 To do this, values must be assigned to the model’s parameters.
These are listed in Table 1. The parameter values are not chosen to tune the model
to be in perfect harmony with any features of the real world. Instead, they are
8Part of the numerical procedure used to compute the model’s solution is outlined in the
Appendix. The algorithm for …nding the equilibrium type distributions, or the ©’s and -’s, is
similar to that employed in Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000). For more detail, see that
source.
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picked to generate an equilibrium that displays several interesting characteristics
that will now be discussed.
TABLE 1: Parameter Values
Tastes ºf = 0:5; !f = 1; »f = 0:325; #f = 0:2;
±f = 3; ¶f = 0:05; &f = 0:3; ¯ = 0:67;
ºm = 0:5; !m = 1; »m = 0:325; #m = 0:35;
±m = 3; ¶m = 0:0325; &m = 0:3; ¸ = 1:
Technology b = 0:30; ´ = 0:5;
® = 0:5; 1 = 0:4; 2 = 0:5;
"1 = 15:15; "2 = 0:5;
Stochastic Structure ¹xje = ¹zje = "1(e¡2 + e¡1)"2; ¾xje = ¾xje = 0:4;
½x = 0:7; ½z = 0:7;
¡(°1) = ¡(°2) = 0:5; ¢(°1j°1) = ¢(°2j°2) = 0:5; °1 = 2:5; °2 = 0;
Simulation Control S = 15; K = 4; m = 2;
Policy Variables a = 0:05:
Properties of the Equilibrium: First, observe from Table 2 that at any point in
time a signi…cant proportion of the adult population is not married. In equilibrium
some people are always single, others experience a divorce. At any time about
85% of the population is married.
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Table 2: Marital Status
(Percentage Distribution)
Young Old
Married 86 85
Single 14 5
Divorced – 10
Second, family income is related to marital status, as Table 3 illustrates. For
example, family income for a household headed by a young single female is 17%
of that for a married couple. This transpires for two reasons. To begin with, in
a marriage there are two potential wage earners versus only one in a household
with a single adult. Additionally, married males and females work more than
unmarried ones — Table 4.
Table 3: Family Income
Young Old
Married 1.00 1.00
Single — female 0.17 0.14
Single — male 0.36 0.41
Divorced — female 0.24
Divorced — male 0.33
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Table 4: Time Allocations
Male Female
Married Single Divorced Married Single Divorced
Work 0.60 0.44 0.41 0.37 0.27 0.27
Nurture 0 0 0 0.21 0.10 0.10
Leisure 0.34 0.56 0.59 0.33 0.46 0.52
Fixed 0.06 0 0 0.09 0.17 0.12
Third, fertility is also related to marital status. Single women have a much
higher fertility rate than married women do. A young married woman has 1.8 kids
on average while a young single woman has 3.3. So, while 85% of the population
is married, only 78.5% of children live in a household with two adults. On average
a female has two children; therefore, the population is stationary.
Fourth, children from a single-female family tend to do much worse. This is
because their mother doesn’t have much time or money to invest in them. A single
mother has less time for work, nurture, and leisure because she has more children
on average; i.e., more of her time is absorbed on the …xed costs of child rearing.
Since she earns less money than a married couple, she has less resources to invest
in her o¤spring also. Additionally, single women tend to have more children than
do married women. The result of these facts is a lower level of human capital
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investment per child in a single female family — Table 5.
Table 5: Investment in Human Capital
Young Old
Married 1.00 0.99
Single female 0.30 0.29
Divorced female 0.37
Table 6 shows the e¤ect of family background on a female’s income. A girl
growing up in a household a single mother can expect to enjoy only two-thirds of
the family income of one growing up with both parents. She is much more likely
(44% versus 20%) to experience an out of wedlock birth or a divorce than the girl
from a two-parent home too — Table 7.
Table 6: E¤ects of Childhood History on Female Income
Childhood History m ! m m! s s ! m s! s
Expected Wage 1.00 0.79 0.75 0.54
Expected Family Income 1.00 0.87 0.85 0.68
Table 7: E¤ects of Childhood History on Female Marital Experience
Adult History m ! m m ! s s ! m s ! s
Childhood History
m! m 0.80 0.09 0.08 0.03
m! s 0.73 0.11 0.11 0.06
s ! m 0.71 0.11 0.11 0.06
s ! s 0.56 0.17 0.16 0.12
Back to Pareto: Figure 1 plots the economy’s income distribution, both in
cumulative distribution function form and à la Pareto. As can be seen the tail
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of the income distribution is fairly well approximated by a straight line, or is
Pareto. (The lower panel plots two reference Pareto distributions with A = 3:3
and ® = 2:0 and A = 28:0 and ® = 10.) The rest is lognormal. (The upper
line plots a lognormal with ¹ = 2:1 and ¾ = 0:87 for a comparison.) As Kuznets
(1989) has noted, it makes a di¤erence whether family or per capita income is
used. The distribution of income is more skewed when per capita income is used
because low income families tend to have more children.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between income and family size for both the
model and the US. The data for the US comes from the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics (PSID). The earnings variable is the present value of future lifetime
household labor income at age 30, as calculated in Knowles (1999). In the data,
fertility declines with labor income. The fertility variable is total number of
children ever born to a woman, who is either head or spouse of the household
head. The model replicates this relationship quite well.
When family income is adjusted for size, the situation portrayed in Table
3 changes. Single males are now the best o¤, since they have no dependents.
Perhaps, this is why they work the least. The situation for unmarried females is
now even bleaker. Income per family member is only 16% of the level realized in
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a married household — Table 8.
Table 8: Family Income per Member
Young Old
Married 1.00 0.97
Single — female 0.16 0.12
Single — male 1.28 1.48
Divorced — female 0.26
Divorced — male 1.18
5.2. Some Comparative Statics Exercises
To gain some insight into the structure of the model, several comparative statics
exercises will be undertaken now.
Elasticity on Quality, #f : Suppose that the elasticity on the quality of children
in the female’s utility function is lowered from 0.2 to 0.19. What happens? The
return at the margin from investing time and resources in children declines more
rapidly now. Hence, parents will tend to invest less in their o¤spring. Instead,
they will choose to have more children. That is, they now prefer quantity relative
to quality. Married females now have 2.0 children on average (versus 1.8 earlier)
while single ones have 3.7 (as compared with 3.3). The population’s annualized
growth rate increases to 0.73% [= (1:0751=10 ¡ 1) £ 100%]. Since there is less
investment per child, the average quality of the mating pool drops. The fraction
of married agents falls by about 3 percentage points.
The Fixed Time Costs of Childrearing, ¶f and ¶m: Let the …xed time cost
of raising a child for a female drop. Speci…cally, let ¶f fall from 0.05 to 0.04.
Since the cost of raising a child has fallen, there are more children in equilibrium.
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Married females now have 2.1 children on average while single ones have 3.9.
Since single females have the most children, the attractiveness of being a single
mother increases. This, too, raises the average number of children per female.
These factors lead the population’s annualized growth rate to increase to 0.98%.
The long-run quality of the mating pool drops. The increase in the quantity of
children comes at the expense of their quality. All parents invest less per child.
There are also more single mothers and they invest less in their children than
do married ones. These tendencies operate to lower the long-run quality of the
matching pool. As a result of these factors, in the new equilibrium the number of
marriages falls by about 4 percentage points.
Leisure Elasticity, &f : What will happen if the utility function for women is
made more elastic with respect to leisure? In particular, let &f = 0:35 as opposed
to 0:30. Women are now willing to work more — both at home and in the market
— since the disutility from working is not rising as fast in terms of e¤ort. There
is now more investment of both goods and time in children. Since married women
work the most this increases the bene…t of marriage. The quality of the matching
pool also rises. The upshot of this is that the number of young single mothers falls
by about 0.7 percentage points. Married women have more children, since at the
margin the disutility from raising more of them has dropped. The population’s
growth rate decreases slightly (because the number of young single women drops).
Consumption Elasticities, ºf and ºm: Consider the impact of making the
utility function more curved in consumption. Reset ºf = ºm = 0:4, as opposed
to the value of 0:5 adopted earlier. The number of marriages now rises by 8.5
percentage points. The population’s growth rate increases to 0.6% per period. The
question is, why? When the marginal utility from consumption declines faster,
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parents divert more of their income into children. They choose to increase both
the quantity and quality of their o¤spring. Additionally, the extra consumption
that males realize from single life is valued less. There will be less children living
with a single parent. These considerations increase the long-run quality of the
mating pool. The number of marriages rises, therefore, on these accounts.
Shock Structure: How does the structure of the shocks a¤ect the equilibrium?
To explore this, the degree of persistence in the matching shock is increased. Now,
¢(°1j°1) = ¢(°2j°2) = 0:9. This leads to drop in the rate of marriage among
the young (from 86 to 74%). When there is a bad match quality shock it will
now persist into the future making marriage less attractive. Since there are more
single mothers, the population’s growth rate increases to about 0.5% per period.
Likewise, increasing persistence in either or both of the type shocks has a similar
e¤ect.
5.3. Nash Bargaining
How does Nash Bargaining work in the model? The Nash Bargaining solution
attains a Pareto-optimal allocation between husband and wife — the details are
in the Appendix. Therefore, there exists some set of weights ½ and (1¡ ½) such
that solving a type-(xi; zj ; °h) young couple’s Nash Bargaining problem, P(8), is
equivalent to solving the Pareto problem
max
l;n;t;d;k
f(1¡ ½)fF (c; e; k; 1¡ l ¡ t) + ¯
SX
k=1
SX
l=1
mX
n=1
max[W2(xk; zl; °n; k; 1) I
m
2 (xl; zl; °n; k);
G2(xk; k; zl)]¢(°nj°h)X (xkjxi)Z(zljzj)g
+½fM(c; e; k; 1¡ n; 1) + ¯
SX
k=1
SX
l=1
mX
n=1
max[H2(xk; zl; °n; k; 1)J
m
2 (xk; zl; °n; k);
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B2(zl; k)]¢(°nj°h)X (xkjxi)Z(zljzj)gg
subject to (3.1) and (3.2). The Pareto weight ½ re‡ects the husband’s bargaining
power and is endogenously determined as a function of the state (xi; zj; °h).
Figure 3 shows how this weight behaves as a function of the state (x; z; °).
Take the case where the match quality variable has the high value. Observe that
the male’s bargaining strength increases with the level of his productivity, z, and
decreases with his wife’s, x. The same is true when the match quality variable
takes on the low value.
Now, suppose that the model is solved holding the weight ½ …xed across states.
For example let ½ = 0:5, which gives husband and wife an equal say in family de-
cision making, so to speak. The number of marriages plummets in equilibrium
from about 85 to 49%. Why? When the weights are …xed, utility can’t be trans-
ferred from one party to the other in order to prevent a breakup and therefore
not nearly as many marriages are sustainable. The degree of positive assortative
mating is much higher than under the Nash Bargaining solution. Figure 4 shows
the set of sustainable marriages in the economy with Nash Bargaining — i.e., the
set of (x; z; °) for which Is1(x; z; °)J
s
1(x; z; °) = 1. With a good match quality
shock virtually all matches are sustainable. Even when the quality of the match
is low most matches are sustainable. No female, however, wants a male from the
low end of the distribution. Males aren’t quite as choosy. When each party’s
bargaining power is held …xed, there is a high degree of assortative mating as Fig-
ure 5 illustrates. Now, when the quality of match is poor most marriages aren’t
sustainable.
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6. Two Public Policy Experiments
Child tax credits are designed to elevate the welfare of all children in the economy.
They transfer income away from families without children to families with them.
Child support payments are targeted at those children who experience a family
breakup because their parents get divorced. Here, to ease the devastating impact
that a divorce can have on family income, governments require fathers to pay
child support to their former wives. To illustrate how a model such as this can
be used, consider the e¤ects of these two public policies.
6.1. Child Tax Credits
Suppose that all families with children, both single and two-parent families, are
eligible to collect a child subsidy. This subsidy provides a tax credit per child
equal to 0.5% of the average level of income in the benchmark economy. It is
…nanced by a lump-sum tax equal to 1.0% of income in the benchmark economy.
What are the e¤ects of this policy?
On the upside, the bene…cial e¤ects of the policy are twofold. First, poor
families will get extra income that should allow them to invest more time and
resources in their children. Second, it should make marriage a more attractive
option for males, since single males are taxed without receiving any subsidy. On
the downside, the attractiveness of marriage for females, however, might decline.
Second, the bene…cial aspects of this policy for children may be dissipated by
larger family size.
The long-run health of the economy is not helped by this policy. First, the
percentage of single mothers increases by about 4.5 percentage points. The per-
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centage of children living with a young single mother rises by about 7 percentage
points. This transpires because young single mothers tend to have more children
than married ones, and because the policy promotes fertility. The (annualized)
population growth rate rises from 0.13 to 1.07%. Single mothers now have 3.9
children as compared with 3.3 for the benchmark economy. Married women now
average 2.1 children (versus 1.8 previously).
To understand the model’s mechanics, it pays to arti…cially decompose the
experiment into short- and long-run e¤ects. For the short-run e¤ects consider the
impact of the child tax credit holding …xed the type distributions for young agents,
or ©1 and -1. This shuts down the e¤ects on the economy from any induced
changes in parental human capital investments. The percentage of single mothers
rises by 2 percentage points. Both single and married women have more children
(3.8 and 2.0). Married couples also substitute quality for quantity of children. The
rise in female headship also reduces the average level of human capital investment
in children. These e¤ects operate to reduce the long-run quality of the mating
pool, leading to a further 3 point rise in the percentage of single mothers.
Average income in the economy falls by about 11%. This occurs because there
is now much less human capital investment in children. First, the increase in
female headship is associated with a reduction in investment in children. Single
mothers have less wherewithal — in terms of both time and goods — than married
couples. Second, with an increase in the quantity of children there is a fall in
their quality. As the price of having an extra child drops parents — married
or otherwise — substitute quantity for quality. Figure 6 shows the impact of a
child tax credit on the steady-state utility distributions for males and females.
The policy makes males worse o¤ in the sense that the utility distribution for the
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benchmark economy stochastically dominates the one for the economy with the
child tax credit. This isn’t the case for females. Women in the lower strata of
the economy are better o¤ with a child tax credit. The rest are slightly worse
o¤. The poorest women have the largest number of children so a tax credit helps
them the most. Since women value children more than men (single men don’t
value them at all), the overall e¤ect of the tax credit on women’s expected utility
is less detrimental than it is for men.
6.2. Child-Support Payments
The per-child rate of support is set in the benchmark equilibrium at 5.0% of
the male’s income. What is the e¤ect of this policy? The answer obtained by
comparing the benchmark equilibrium to one without child support.
The removal of child support leads to a 0.65 point drop in the percentage of
marriages. This is caused by both a rise in the number of young single females
(0.8 percentage points) and an increase in divorces among the old (0.3 percentage
points). Average income falls by about 1%. The rate of growth in the population
rises ever so slightly from 0.13 to 0.19%. These e¤ects seem moderate. The
question is why.
One would expect that child support would make marriage and divorce less
attractive for males and more attractive for females. The net impact will depend
on which party is more likely to walk from a marriage. When child support is
eliminated, marriages between high-type males and low-type females turn out to
be more likely to break up. Without child support, a high-type male demands
more than his low-type wife is willing to bear. Marriages between low-type males
and high-type females, however, are less likely to dissolve. With child support in
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place, high-type females ask for more than a low-type male is willing to contribute
to a marriage. The net e¤ect on the equilibrium number of divorces is very small.
Some of the drop in the equilibrium number of marriages derives from the fact
that divorced mothers now invest less in their children (about 7% drop in e) and
this drives down the long-run quality of the mating pool. This can be seen by
examining the impact of removing child support, which is done by holding the
type distributions for young agents, or ©1 and -1, …xed. Again, this turns o¤
the e¤ects on the economy from any induced changes in parental human capital
investments. When this is done the number of marriages drops by 0.45 percentage
points. Hence, about 0.20 percentage points of the fall in the number of marriages
is due to the drop in the long-run quality of the mating pool.
Nash Bargaining, again: The elimination of child support leads to some inter-
esting reallocations within the family. When child support is eliminated an older
female has a lower threat point. So her husband has relatively more bargaining
power. Let B2 and C2 denote the combinations of (x; z; °; k) that generate viable
marriages among the old in the benchmark and no-child support equilibriums.
The old male’s weight increases for each and every (x; z; °; k) 2 B2 \ C2. The
average weight for males rises from 0.57 to 0.60. Older females do indeed work
more.9 Their leisure falls by almost 4 percentage points. Almost all of this is due
to increased work in the market. (These changes are also due in part to the fact
that high-type women constitute a larger fraction of marriages now.) Now, con-
9To calculate the average one needs to know how many type-(x; z; °; k) marriages there
are. The distribution of marriages will be di¤erent for the benchmark and no-child support
economies. The average was computed using the distribution from the benchmark economy —
so as to not contaminate the changes in the male’s weights with the shift in the distribution.
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sider the impact on a young male’s weight. Denote by B1 and C1 the combinations
of (x; z; °) that generate viable marriages among in the benchmark and no-child
support steady states. Surprisingly, a young male’s weight decreases for each and
every (x; z; °) 2 B1\C1! Why? A young female realizes that the gains from being
married when she is old are lower when there is no child support in place. Hence,
she will be more reluctant to marry when she is young. She demands more from
her young suitor. Figure 7 shows the decline in the young male’s weight, ½, that
occurs when child-support is withdrawn — the …gure shows the average weight
for each type of married male. On average, the young male’s weight falls from
0.61 to 0.60. Therefore, some of the gains that males realize when child support
is removed are redistributed back to females. A young married female’s leisure
rises by 1.8 percentage points, on average.
Last, the manner in which households undertake their decision-making appears
to be important for analyzing the consequences of economic policy. To see this,
suppose that the Nash bargaining weights are held at their benchmark values
when child support payments are eliminated. Now, the equilibrium number of
marriages plummets by 10 percentage points. Average income drops by 18%. A
marriage is no longer as ‡exible as before. One party is less able to transfer utility
to the other in order to keep the marriage viable.
7. Conclusion
An overlapping generations model of marriage, divorce, and the quantity and
quality of children is developed here to study the distribution of income. Singles
meet in a marriage market and are free to accept or reject marriage proposals from
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the opposite sex. Likewise, married agents must decide whether or not to remain
with their current spouses. Within a marriage, decisions about how much to work,
the number of children, and the amount of time and money to invest per child are
decided by Nash Bargaining. In the model’s general equilibrium, some adults are
married while others aren’t. Some females have children in wedlock, others out
of it. Marital status and income are related. Families headed by a single mother
are the poorest. Likewise, fertility and income are also related. Fertility declines
with income. Single mothers have the most children. Children raised by a single
mother have a greater tendency (relative to other children) to grow up poor due
to a lack of human capital investment. The distribution of income is more skewed
when family size is taken into account.
Can social policies be designed to improve the society’s welfare? Future gen-
erations of the prototype model may shed insight on such questions. To illustrate
how the model could be used in such a context the impact of child tax credit
and child support payments are considered. When the number of children is held
…xed, child tax credits increase the amount of income per child. But, the number
of children cannot be held …xed since the policy promotes an increase in family
size. It also reduces the attractiveness of marriage for females. On net, child tax
credits fail to elevate the well being of society.
Child support payments are aimed to insulate children from the drop in family
income that occurs when their parents divorce. Child support payments should
make divorce more attractive for females and less attractive for males. The e¤ect
on the equilibrium number of marriages is small. This is because child support
payments reduce marital breakups between high-type males and low-type females,
but promote breakups between low-type males and high-type females. This ex-
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periment highlights the fact that the form of household decision making may be
important for designing public policy. Child support payments transfer resources
away from husbands toward wives, other things equal. This strengthens the hand
of married women vis à vis their husbands. With Nash bargaining utility can
be transferred away from a husband to a wife to keep a marriage sustainable, so
long as it is in the husband’s interest to do so. But, to the extent that single
males have the option to remain unmarried, part of this transfer will be undone
by renegotiating the terms of marriage. Last, the model is still too crude to place
con…dence in the results for these two policy experiments. Future generations of
the model, however, may be able to enlist in public service.
8. Appendix A: Algorithm for Nash Bargaining
Representing the Nash Bargaining Problem as a Pareto Problem: Consider the
Nash Bargaining problem when the number of children, k, is held …xed. The
solution to this problem is Pareto optimal, a fact demonstrated later. Therefore,
for some Pareto weight ½(k) 2 (0; 1) it solves
max
0n;l;t1;d
f(1¡ ½(k))[F (c; e; k; 1¡ l ¡ t)¡G (x; k; z)
+ ½(k)[M(c; e; k; 1¡ n;Â)¡B (z; k)]g; P(11)
subject to the constraints for household production and human capital investment.
Given the presence of the inequality constraints this is a nontrivial Kuhn-Tucker
problem. For instance, in some marriages the woman will work in the market,
while in others she won’t.
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Consider the case where an interior solution obtains. The …rst-order conditions
for an interior solution are:
(1¡ ½(k))Fc + ½(k)Mc = ¡½(k)Mn
ªz
; (8.1)
(1¡ ½(k))Fc + ½(k)Mc = ¡(1¡ ½(k)) Fl
ªx
; (8.2)
[(1¡ ½(k))Fe + ½(k)Me]Qt = ¡(1¡ ½(k))Ft; (8.3)
and
ª[(1¡ ½(k))Fc + ½(k)Mc] = [(1¡ ½(k))Fe + ½(k)Me]Qd: (8.4)
Observe that when ½(k) = [F +W ¡ G]=f[M + H ¡ B] + [F +W ¡G]g the
solution to the Pareto problem P(11) will correspond with the solution to
max
0n;l;t1;d
f [F (c; e; k; 1¡ l ¡ t) +W ¡G (x; k; z)]
£[M(c; e; k; 1¡ n;Â) + H ¡B (z; k)]g; P(12)
subject to the constraints for household production and human capital investment,
and where W and H are the continuation values associated with the married state.
This fact is readily veri…able by comparing the …rst-order conditions associated
with the two problems while imposing the condition ½(k) = [F +W ¡G]=f[M +
H ¡ B] + [F +W ¡ G]g. This shows that the solution to the Nash Bargaining
problem is Pareto optimal.
Solving the Nash Bargaining problem: It is easier to solve numerically the
Pareto problem P(11) than the Nash Bargaining problem P(12). The Nash bar-
gaining problem can only be easily solved on the set of viable marriages. In
advance it is hard to know what this set is. To compute the solution to the
Pareto problem requires …nding the weight ½(k) that maximizes the product of
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the net gains from marriage, again holding …xed the number of children, k. So,
the algorithm proceeds by making a guess for ½(k). The problem P(11) is then
solved using this guess. This involves numerically solving the set of equations
(8.1) to (8.4), or their analogues that incorporate the appropriate Kuhn-Tucker
conditions — a married woman may not work in the market, for instance. This
gives values for F and M . The weight is then updated using the formula
½(k) = minfmaxf [F +W ¡G]
[M + H ¡B] + [F +W ¡G] ; ±g; 1¡ ±g;
for some small ± > 0. Therefore, 0 < ½(k) < 1. The Pareto problem is then
recomputed using the new weight. The algorithm proceeds until a …xed point is
found. This gives the values of M + H ¡ B and F +W ¡G for a …xed number
of kids, k. Sometimes a …xed point cannot be found, because the marriage is not
viable. For a marriage to be viable, M +H¡B and F +W¡G must both exceed
zero. Observe that if M + H ¡ B < 0 then ½(k) > 1, while if F +W ¡ G < 0
then ½(k) < 0. Therefore, it is easy deduce which marriages are viable or not. For
example, set ½(k) = 1¡ ± and solve the Pareto problem P(11): If M +H ¡B < 0
then there is no viable marriage from the male’s perspective.
Last, when the number of kids is also a choice variable the algorithm then
picks k 2 K over the set of viable marriages to maximize the Nash Product:
max
k2K
[F +W ¡G][M + H ¡B]:
Now, let k¤ denote the solution to the above problem and de…ne ½ by ½ = ½(k¤).
The is the weight used in the couple’s Pareto problem outlined in Section 5.3.10
10The number of kids is discrete. It is still true, however, that the Nash Bargaining problem
solves a Pareto problem. Suppose that k¤ =arg max
k
[X(k)Y (k)], for some functions X and Y .
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